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RECENT CASES

court was applying the rule against impeachment of one's own witness to
the evidence presented and that failure by plaintiff to make a submissible
case resulted therefrom. Under this interpretation, Zabol does not appear
to be a continuance of any liberalizing trend evidenced in Wells v.
Goforth. 64 At the very least, this decision seems to be an indication that the
Missouri Supreme Court intends to maintain the rule against impeachment of one's own witness in its present form.
DAVID M. BROWN

PRECONCEPTION TORT-THE NEED
FOR A LIMITATION
Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital'
In October, 1965, Emma Renslow, then thirteen years old, was given
two transfusions of Rh-positive blood. Her own blood had an Rh-negative
characteristic and was sensitized by the transfusions. She had no knowledge of the improper transfusions or of the incompatibility of the transfused blood with her own. Approximately nine years after the transfusions,
Renslow gave birth to a daughter, Leah, who was born with serious hemolytic defects. The mother sued the defendant hospital and physician on her
own behalf for her personal injuries. The mother also brought suit as next
friend on behalf of her daughter for injuries suffered by the child. For the
child's cause of action, it was alleged that the injuries resulted from the
negligent blood transfusions more than seven years prior to the infant's
conception. The trial court dismissed the infant's action because the
alleged injury had been inflicted before the infant was conceived. The appellate court reversed. 2 The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the appellate court and held that the infant's petition had stated a cause of action.
Whether an infant should be allowed a cause of action for prenatal
injuries sustained as a result of negligent conduct occurring prior to the
infant's conception is a relatively new issue. 3 A brief history of the cause of
64. 443 S.W.2d 155 (Mo. En Banc 1969). Ihe Missouri Supreme Court
changed the rule against impeachment of one's own witness to allow the use of
prior inconsistent statements in order to impeach one's own witness where that
witness is the adverse party in a civil case.
1. 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
2. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 40 Ill. App. 3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870
(1976).
3. Although no Missouri court has ruled on this question, the Eighth CirPublished
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action for prenatal injury may lend a better perspective to this question.
The common law rule and the rule in this country for many years was that
an infant had no cause of action for tortious injuries sustained while the infant was en ventre sa mere (within the mother's womb). 4 A reason often
cited by courts denying such a cause of action was that a fetus had no identity apart from its mother; an infant negligently injured before birth thus
had no right to recover. 5 This rule was followed strictly during the first half
of this century.6 Beginning with Bonbrest v. Kotz, 7 the rule was rapidly
abandoned; at present every state that has dealt with the issue permits an
infant a cause of action for prenatal injuries sustained as a result of a
8
defendant's negligent conduct while the infant was in the womb.
Although a cause of action has been recognized in the child, the parents
generally have no cause of action in their own behalf for the infant's prenatal injuries. 9 Underlying this view is the recognition that a fetus and its
negligent acts occurring prior to the infant's conception. Bergstreser v. Mitchell,
577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978). There have been other cases-analogous to Renslow.
Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Labs., Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973) (strict
liability cause of action granted for prenatal injuries allegedly resulting from the
mother's consumption of the defendant's oral contraceptive product); Piper v.
Hoard, 107 N.Y. 73, 13 N.E. 626 (1887) (cause of action granted for alleged
fraudulent misrepresentations made by the defendant to the plaintiff's mother
prior to the plaintiff's conception); Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400
N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977) (complaint stated a cause of action for wrongful life for
alleged negligence of obstetricians in failing to warn parents prior to conception
that another child would likely suffer from genetic disease).
4. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 356-59, 157 A.2d 497, 498-503 (1960).
5. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill.
App. 2d 240, 248, 190 N.E.2d 849, 852
(1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
6. See, e.g., Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921); Berlin
v. J.C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940).
7. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
8. See, e.g., Huskey v. Smith, 289 Ala. 52, 265 So. 2d 596 (1972); Womack
v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718,187 N.W.2d 218 (1971); Steggallv. Morris, 363 Mo.
1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (En Banc 1953) (dictum); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76,
220 A.2d 222 (1966); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d 288, 367
P.2d 835 (1962); Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1971). In Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C.
257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960), the court restricted its decision to permitting a cause
of action where the prenatal injuries were sustained at a time when the infant was
a viable fetus. However, the trend appears to be toward permitting an infant to
maintain an action for prenatal injuries regardless of the viability of the fetus at
the time the injury was sustained. See, e.g., Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill. App. 2d 218,
178 N.E.2d 691 (1961); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960).
9. Smith v. Brennan, 31 NJ. 353, 364, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960); Steggall
v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 1231-32, 258 S.W.2d 577, 580-81 (En Banc 1953).
Although the parents have no cause of action for the infant's prenatal injuries,
they have been allowed a cause of action for the wrongful death of an infant who
is born alive but later dies as a result of prenatal injuries negligently inflicted
while the infant was a viable fetus. E.g., Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258
S.W.2d 577 (En Banc 1953); Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss1/13
820 (Tex. 1967). In addition some jurisdictions have held that there is a cause of
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mother are separate organisms from the time of conception.I'
Because Leah Renslow sustained injury at the moment of or immediately after conception, Renslow is a prenatal injury case." However, it
differs slightly from the traditional prenatal injury action. In the traditional case the fetus is injured by tortious conduct occurring after the fetus
is conceived. 12 Renslow granted a cause of action for prenatal injuries
resulting from negligent conduct which occurred several years prior to the
infant's 'conception. It is difficult to regard conduct as wrongful toward a
person who is not yet conceived at the time of the act. However, this difficulty should not pose a barrier to a Renslow type cause of action. The
question should not be whether the tortious action occurred prior to or
after conception, but rather whether the injury occurred at the time of or
after conception.1 3 The recognition of a cause of action for prenatal injuries sustained as a result of negligent acts occurring prior to the infant's
conception is a logical extension of the development in prenatal injury
law.

14

Nevertheless, there are several possible arguments against recognition
of such a cause of action. An argument certain to be heard from the
medical profession is that permitting such an action to be maintained

action for the wrongful death of a viable fetus which is stillborn as a result of
prenatal injuries. E.g., Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304
N.E.2d 88 (1973); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976). However, Missouri
courts have denied a cause of action for the wrongful death of a viable fetus that is
stillborn as a result of prenatal injuries. State ex rel. Hardin v. Sanders, 538
S.W.2d 336 (Mo. En Banc 1976).
10. See Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 485, 147 A.2d 108, 110 (1958).
11. A prenatal injury action should be distinguished from a wrongful life
suit. The plaintiff in a prenatal injury action is attempting to hold the defendant
liable for prenatal injuries allegedly resulting from the defendant's negligence. In
an action for wrongful life, the plaintiff instead is alleging that had the defendant
not been negligent, the infant would not have been born. Comment, An Unreasonable Limitation on a Physician's Liability in a Wrongful Life Suit, 12 NEw
ENGLAND L. REV. 819, 820 (1977); Note, Torts- Wrongful Birth and Wrongful

Life, 44 MO. L. REV. 167, 177 (1979). Courts generally have denied a cause of action for wrongful life, often on the grounds that damages would be impossible to
measure. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967);
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). But see
Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977).
12. See, e.g., Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218
(1971); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Or. 690, 291 P.2d 225 (1955).
13. See Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Labs., Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir.
1973).
14. There appears to be no reason why Missouri courts would not make such
a logical extension and recognize a cause of action for prenatal injuries resulting
from negligent conduct occurring prior to the infant's conception. Bergstreser v.
Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22, 25 (8th Cir. 1978). See State ex rel. Hardin v. Sanders, 538
S.W.2d 336 (Mo.
Banc School
1976);ofSteggall
v. Morris,
363 Mo.
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would create an unreasonable burden on that profession. 15 In addition, as
forcefully asserted by Justice Ryan in his dissent to Renslow, 16 the tremendous expansion in recent years of recognized tort causes of action has increased costs to the public to such an extent that to allow maintenance of
Renslow type actions might make the economic burden on the public
unbearable. 17 It could be argued that the lack of precedent for such a
cause of action speaks against its recognition. 18 Recognition of such a
cause of action also might give rise to many cases involving stale claims first
asserted forty or fifty years after the negligent conduct.' 9 Finally, there is
an argument that the difficulty in proving the causal connection between
the preconception tort and the infant's injury will lead to speculation and
conjecture by the jury regarding causation and open the door for a flood of
20
fraudulent and fictitious claims.
The preceding arguments do not warrant rejection of the Renslow type
action. The argument that this cause of action would create an unreasonable burden on the medical profession might be well received by some.
However, this in itself is not an adequate reason for giving members of the
medical profession preferential treatment or immunity from liability for
2
negligence. 1
Regardless of the accuracy of the claim that the economic burden on
the public will become worse if Renslow type actions are allowed, the
public has a direct interest in seeing that such a cause of action does exist.
An infant born and forced to live with serious mental or physical injuries or
deformities may eventually become a public charge.2 2 In addition, the
notion that all persons shall have a remedy for tortiously inflicted injuries
should not be abandoned merely because the tort occurs before the injured
23
person's conception.
15. See Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 231, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204, 211 (Sup.
Ct. 1976), modified, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977).
16. 67 Ill. 2d at 372, 367 N.E.2d at 1262.
17. Id. at 378-80, 367 N.E.2d at 1265-66. According to this rationale, the
"traditional limits of tort law" have been relaxed in recent years so as to oblige the
tort theory of spreading the loss over a large base. The greater number and size of

verdicts that have resulted have in turn resulted in greatly increased costs of

health, automobile, and malpractice insurance, creating a severe economic
burden on individual members of the public. Id.
18. See Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 359, 157 A.2d 497, 500 (1960).
19. This argument was raised in Renslow but rejected by the court. 67 Ill.
2d at 358-59, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
20. See Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 278, 164 A.2d 93, 98 (1960) (Bell, J.,
dissenting).
21. Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 231, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204, 211 (Sup. Ct.
1976), modified, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977).
22. Day v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 328 So. 2d 560, 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976). "Where the injury or deformity is caused by the fault of another,
fairness dictates that the financial needs of such child should be borne by the tortfeasor rather than the taxpayer."
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss1/13
23. See Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 485, 147 A.2d 108, 110 (1958).
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A mere lack of precedent also should not cause a rejection of the infant's claim. A similar rationale was popular earlier in this century to
24
justify the denial of a cause of action in traditional prenatal injury cases.
However, the right to recover in those situations evolved from court decisions; 25 a similar fate should befall the lack of precedent argument in the
present context. "The novelty of an asserted right and the lack of common'26
law precedent therefor are not valid reasons for denying its existence.
There is no doubt that problems of stale claims will arise where a
Renslow type cause of action is recognized. Existing statutes of limitation
could ameliorate this problem in many circumstances. 27 However, even in
24. White, The Right of Recovery for PrenatalInjuries, 12 LA. L. REv.
383, 390 (1952).
25. See Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 720-22, 187 N.W.2d 218,
222 (1971); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 270-71, 164 A.2d 93, 94-96 (1960).
26. Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281, 285 (W.D. Mich. 1949).
27. See Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. En Banc 1968); RSMo
§ 516.105 (Supp. 1976); RSMo § 516.140 (1969). Under § 516.140, malpractice
actions against hospitals, physicians, surgeons, and others are barred unless commenced within two years from the date of the negligent act. Laughlin v.
Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. En Banc 1968). This section was in effect when
the Renslow action was commenced. Because Renslow was a negligence action
against a hospital and physician and was begun more than nine years after the
negligent conduct, it appears that had the action been commenced in Missouri, it
would have been barred. See Barnhoffv. Aldridge, 327 Mo. 767, 38 S.W.2d 1029
(1931); Davis, Tort Liability and the Statu'es of Limitation, 33 Mo. L. REV. 171
(1968).

However, application of § 516.140 to Renslow type actions could result in the
anomalous situation in which the limitation period of two years would expire
before the infant-plaintiff ever had the right to sue (there would be no injury to
the infant until conception). The response of Missouri courts is difficult to forecast. If the court were to view such an outcome with disfavor, it might construe
RSMo § 516.170 (1969), in such a way as to toll the running of the two-year period
in Renslow type actions. This might not be a very difficult step to make because a
disability under § 516.170 can toll the two-year limitation period for medical
malpractice actions in § 516.140. Jaime v. Neurological Hosp. Assoc., 488
S.W.2d 641 (Mo. 1973).
The tolling provisions of § 516.170 would not be applicable, however, to
RSMo § 516.105 (Supp. 1976), which is a new statute of limitation regarding
medical malpractice actions. See RSMo §§ 516.105,.170 (Supp. 1976). This provision, which replaces the medical malpractice portion of § 516.140, became
effective in 1976 and is specifically excepted from the tolling provisions of §
516.170.

This new medical malpractice statute does contain its own tolling provision
with regard to infants less than ten years of age, who would have until their
twelfth birthday to bring the action. RSMo § 516.105 (Supp. 1976). With the exception of "foreign object" cases (where the so-called "discovery rule" is adopted)
and in cases involving infants less than ten years of age, the same "two years from
the date of the act of neglect" period is retained. The statute provides that in no
event shall any medical malpractice action be commenced more than ten years
from the "date of the act of neglect complained of." Id.
RSMoof §Missouri
516.105
(Supp.
and RSMo
§ 516.140
PublishedThus,
by University
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of Law1976)
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states where the statutes of limitation would not prevent stale claims arising under this cause of action, 28 the possibility of stale claims and the
resulting difficulty of defense should not be sufficient reasons to deny the
cause of action entirely.
Although there undoubtedly will be considerable difficulty in establishing causal connection in prenatal injury cases in which the negligent
act complained of occurred prior to the infant's conception, 29 the mere
danger of fictitious claims is not a valid reason for a blanket denial of the
cause of action. 30 Courts have always had to deal with the danger of fictitious claims and have adequately prevented such claims by requiring the
presentation of sufficient evidence and by adherence to the rules of
3
evidence. 1
No one argument, nor all of them combined, justifies total nonrecognition of a cause of action for prenatal injuries sustained as a result of
negligent conduct which occurred prior to the infant's conception. However, even if it is agreed that, at least in some cases, an infant should be
permitted to bring such a lawsuit, there must be some limit upon this
right. The need for such a limitation can be illustrated in scenarios.
actions. It appears, however, that stale claims would not be adequately prevented
by the Missouri statutes of limitation where the Renslow type action was for other
than medical malpractice. See RSMo § 516.100, .120(4) (1969).
There are no Missouri court decisions in regard to the applicability of the
Missouri statutes of limitation to preconception negligence suits. But, in a
Renslow type action that was commenced approximately five years after the
alleged preconception negligent conduct, the Eighth Circuit, relying on the applicable tolling provisions for infants, held that neither RSMo § 516.140 (1969)
nor RSMo § 516.105 (Supp. 1976) would bar the infant's action. Bergstreser v.
Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978). However, since the action was brought less
than five years following the negligent act, the Bergstreser court did not have
before it the question of whether a Renslow type action would be barred by RSMo
§ 516.105 (Supp. 1976) if commenced more than ten years after the preconception negligent act. Consequently, the Bergstresercourt did not rule on that issue.
See Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22, 26 (8th Cir. 1978).
28. The existing statutes of limitations in most states would fail to prevent
stale claims from arising under Renslow type actions. See, e.g., Tomlinson v.
Siehl, 459 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1970); Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788
(1959). As demonstrated by the Renslow decision, the statute of limitation in effect when the action was brought would not obviate the possible stale claims that
could arise from such actions. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, §§ 15, 22 (SmithHurd 1966). Under those sections an action for personal injury must be commenced within two years of the accrual of the cause of action; if the plaintiff is an
infant at the time of accrual, he may bring the action within two years after
reaching majority. Id.
29. See Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to
PrenatalInjuries, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 554 (1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 869, comment d (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970).
30. Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 241, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731, 219
N.Y.S.2d 34, 37 (1961). See Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 486, 147 A.2d
108, 110 (1958).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss1/13
31. Smith v. Brennan, 31 NJ. 353, 366, 157 A.2d 497, 503-04 (1960).
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Scenario one-A hospital staff physician negligently administers

medication to a young girl. The drug radically alters the girl's chromosome structure, and years later she gives birth to a daughter whose
chromosome structure is damaged by the alteration in the mother's
chromosomes. This damage is not detected because no outward deformity
appears. Several years later, the daughter gives birth to a child suffering
from a deformity resulting from the damage to the chromosome structures
of the mother and grandmother. It is quite possible, if the holding and
reasoning of Renslow are followed, that the deformed infant will be able to
maintain an action against the hospital which two generations earlier provided the drug to the infant's grandmother.
Scenario two -A fifteen-year-old girl, while crossing a street, is struck
by a negligently driven automobile. As a result, the girl sustains multiple
fractures of her pelvis. Eight years later, the girl gives birth to an infant.
The child sustains prenatal injuries because of a previously undetected
malformation in the mother's pelvis. The malformation resulted from the
improper healing of the pelvis following the fracture eight years earlier. As
the Renslow court did not limit the child's cause of action to medical
malpractice actions, it would be possible for the injured infant to maintain
an action against the driver of the automobile. Thus, the mother could
recover for her personal injuries shortly after the accident, and the infant
could recover for prenatal injuries several years later. The defendant could
be subjected to recurring litigation.
Scenario three-A thirteen-year-old girl becomes involved in drug

abuse. Seven years after stopping the use of drugs, the girl gives birth to an
infant with defective internal organs. The defect resulted from the
mother's earlier drug use. Since the early 1960's, a number of states have
abrogated the doctrine of parental immunity in certain types of negligence
actions.3 2 If Renslow is followed in such a jurisdiction, the infant could
maintain an action against his mother for prenatal injuries sustained as a
result of the mother's drug abuse years before the child's conception.
In view of the potential problems illustrated above, it is evident that
the Renslow type cause of action should be limited in some way. First,
recognition of this cause of action without limitation could pose problems,
not only in measuring the insurance risk, but also in the possibility of
claims by successive generations.33 Second, recognition of an unlimited
cause of action would subject many defendants to the burden of defending

32. Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 5-6, 199 N.W.2d 169, 171 (1972). See,
e.g., Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). Missouri has indi-

cated that the doctrine of parental immunity will not bar an action where the

policy reasons for the doctrine are not applicable. See Brennecke v. Kilpatrick,
336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. En Banc 1960).
33.by University
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potential
problems
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stale claims. Although the stale claim problem does not justify denial of
the cause of action, it could justify a limitation. Finally, to allow an infant
to maintain such an action against his mother or father could result in the
danger that the parental immunity doctrine was designed to prevent, i.e.,
strife between family members and the resultant disruption of domestic
34
tranquility.
There are several judicial limitations which could be applied to restrict
the breadth of the Renslow holding. The negligence concepts of duty,
proximate cause and unforeseeable plaintiff could be applied to this area
to deny a cause of action in what a court deemed to be appropriate circumstances. The broad tort concept of duty (the idea that an actor cannot be
liable to another person if he owes no "duty" to the other) could be utilized
so that a court might find that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff
who was conceived several years after the negligent act. A court also might
declare that the defendant's negligent act several years prior to the plaintiff's conception was not a sufficiently direct cause of the plaintiff's injury
on which to base liability, i.e., that it was not the proximate cause of injury.3 5 Closely related to proximate cause is the unforeseeable plaintiff
concept.16 Under this doctrine a defendant owes no duty to those persons
to whom injury from his conduct could not reasonably be anticipated or
foreseen.3 7 Thus, a court could state that the infant-plaintiff, conceived
several years after the defendant's negligent act, was a person to whom
harm could not have been reasonably anticipated, and the defendant
would therefore not be liable for the infant-plaintiff's injuries.
These tort concepts are unacceptable limitations on Renslow type
38
causes of action. The issue of the existence of duty is a question of law.
Legal duties are "merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a par-

34. Prevention of strife between family members which might result from
intrafamily litigation was traditionally the public policy rationale for the doctrine
of parental immunity. Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 204, 241 N.E.2d
12, 14 (1968). Many courts have dismissed the "family strife" rationale in certain
negligence actions, often on the grounds that the family harmony is disrupted by
the negligent act, before there is any litigation. See, e.g., Hebel v. Hebel, 435
P.2d 8, 13 (Alaska 1967). However, it is questionable whether this reasoning
would apply if the negligent act of the parent occurred years before the infant was
conceived. In addition the public would seem to have an interest in denying an
infant a Renslow type action against his father or mother; if the action was permitted to be maintained, it could result in a parent being liable to his or her child
for negligent acts committed by the parent, while the parent was only an infant.
See Note, The Impact of MedicalKnowledge on the Law Relatingto PrenatalInjuries, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 554, 584 (1962).
35. Edgerton, Legal Cause (pt. 2), 72 U. PA. L. REV. 343, 360-61 (1924).
36. Prosser, The Minnesota Court on Proximate Cause, 21 MINN. L. REV.
19, 21, 31 (1936).
37. Id. at 31-32.
38. Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1401,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss1/13
1418 (1961).
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ticular type, liability should be imposed for damage done."3 9 Similarly,
proximate cause is often an abbreviated way for a court to express a certain
result, 40 that result frequently based on the judges' personal conception of
justice. 41 The unforeseeable plaintiff concept is likewise one used by courts
to manifest results that the courts deem to be just. 42 Because judicial limitations imposed in one decision could be expanded in a subsequent case,
such restrictions could be unpredictable and seemingly arbitrary. Consequently, they would not constitute an effective restraint on this cause of
action. A more uniform and easily ascertainable method of defining the
boundaries of the Renslow cause of action is needed.
As mentioned previously, applicable statutes of limitation could bar
some Renslow type actions. '43 A statute barring actions not commenced
within a fixed time from the date of the negligent act would restrict this
cause of action to some extent.44 However, application of a statute of this
nature would be an arbitrary and fortuitous limitation. The fortuity of the
time of conception would be the only distinction between an allowable
preconception cause of action and one that was barred. With a statute of
limitation of this type, the limitation period could expire before the child
even had the right to sue (the infant-plaintiff would not sustain the injury
until conception). Moreover, such a statute of limitation scheme would not
prevent the situation in which the injured infant could maintain a Renslow
type action against his natural mother or father. For these reasons, a
single-faceted statute of limitation would not be an adequate constraint on
this cause of action.
Despite the objections to a simple statute of limitation as a tool for
limiting recovery for preconception torts, some statutory scheme should be
developed to accomplish this goal. A statute would be a more effective
limitation than judicial application of tort concepts like duty and proximate cause. A statute would provide certainty and consistency; judicial
limitations would be subject to expansion in any later decision. 45
39. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434, 551 P.2d
334, 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22 (1976).
40. White, supra note 24, at 401.
41. See Edgerton, supra note 35, at 345-46.
42. See Prosser, PalsgrafRevisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1953).
43. See Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. En Banc 1968); RSMo
§ 516.105 (Supp. 1976); RSMo § 516.140 (1969).
44. However, without specific language to the contrary, the application of
the doctrine of "continuing negligence" could nullify the effectiveness of such a
statute of limitation. See Puro v. Henry, 32 Conn. Supp. 118, 342 A.2d 65 (1975),
in which CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (West 1960), which provides that
medical malpractice actions must be commenced within three years of the date of
the act or omission complained of, did not bar an action more than three years
after a medical operation where the action sought damages for leaving a foreign
object in the plaintiff's body. The court said that the failure of the defendants to
warn by
theUniversity
plaintiff
the foreign
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constituted
continuing
45. See Prosser, supra note 42; White, supra note 24, atAO1.
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Accordingly, a statute is proposed that would expressly restrict this
cause of action ir terms of both potential defendants and potential plaintiffs. In an attempt to strike a balance between the rights of infants injured
before birth due to a negligent act before conception and the public interest in minimizing stale claims and in ensuring that liability is not expanded
too far, a statute is recommended which would provide three specific limitations on preconception tort actions. First, the statute should exclude the
natural parents of the infant as possible defendants. This would promote
the public interest in preventing the disruption of family harmony that
could result from permitting an infant to maintain a Renslow type action
against his own father or mother. The second limitation would be a bar on
all Renslow type actions against all other real persons if not commenced
within five years from the date of the negligent conduct. This second limit,
however, would not apply to actions against members of the medical profession or medical institutions for negligent performance in rendering professional services. This restraint would protect most members of the public
from the difficulty of defending stale claims that could arise from Renslow
type actions, and also would reduce the prospect of recurring litigation.
Members of the medical profession, institutions such as hospitals, and corporations might have to face recurring litigation and stale claims. The lack
of protection for these categories of defendants admittedly is rather arbitrary. This distinction can be justified on the grounds that these defendants generally are better able to bear the burdens of large recoveries,
recurring litigation, and defending stale claims than private individuals,
not only because of the relatively greater insurance coverage carried by
such defendants, but also for the fact that such defendants can spread
these costs (including increased insurance premiums) by increases in the
price of products or services. 46 Finally, as to possible plaintiffs, the third
facet of this proposed statute would limit recovery to situations where the
plaintiff is a member of the first generation to follow the preconception
negligent act. It is suggested that in conjunction with this "first generation" limitation, an additional limit be applied barring all Renslow type
actions for medical malpractice if not commenced within five years from
the date of birth. An action for medical malpractice brought by a member
of the first generation to follow the negligent act would be barred unless
commenced within five years after the date of birth.47 This would lessen
the problems that an institution, such as a hospital, would otherwise face
in measuring insurance risks and in being subject to claims from successive
generations.
46. See Cooperrider, A Comment on the Law of Torts, 56 MICH. L. REV.
1291 (1958).
47. The result would be much different if a traditional statute of limitation
was applied to a Renslow type cause of action. Many states provide that if the
plaintiff was an infant at the time the cause of action accrued, he has until a certain period after reaching majority in which to bring the action. See, e.g.,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss1/13

Graham v. Sisco, 248 Ark. 6, 449 S.W.2d 949 (1970).
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This three-fold statutory limitation is proposed as an attempt to
balance the public interest in preventing liability from extending beyond
certain bounds with the need to protect the rights of infants suffering
prenatal injuries. The content of the statute is not nearly as important as
the need for some kind of limitation. The legislature is the proper authority to specify public policy and set the substance of the limitation.
There are possible problems posed by the proposed statute. For example, the courts would have to deal with the interaction of such a statute
with the existing statutes of limitation. A court probably should interpret
the statute as controlling over existing statutes of limitation to the extent
that they are in irreconcilable conflict. 48 A more important consideration,
however, is the constitutionality of such a proposal. A statute which denies
a cause of action to some persons while allowing it to others who are
similarly situated, e.g., the suggested one-generation limit, could be held
unconstitutional on grounds of violating due process or equal protection. 49
A similar constitutional problem might arise with a statute which completely denies a cause of action against a certain category of defendants,
such as the suggested exclusion of the infant's natural parents as possible
defendants.- 0 These constitutional difficulties, as well as the proper social
and public policy direction for the statute will have to be considered by the
legislatures, and eventually by the courts, as the boundaries of this new
preconception tort are developed.
It has been said that an infant has a right to begin his life with both a
sound mind and a sound body. 5' In at least some situations an infant
should be allowed to maintain an action for prenatal injuries sustained as a

48. See Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. En Banc 1968) (a
special statute of limitation controls over a general one to the extent that they are
in conflict and cannot be harmonized).
49. Statutes of limitation providing that medical malpractice actions must
be commenced within two years from the date of the negligent act have been
upheld in the face of constitutional (due process) attack by courts using a "reasonableness" standard. Owen v. Wilson, 260 Ark. 21, 537 S.W.2d 543 (1976) (implying that if the limitation period was so short that it was, as a practical matter, a
denial of the right, it would be unreasonable); Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d
308 (Mo. En Banc 1968). In Missouri, a statute of limitation will not be a denial of
due process unless the "time allowed for commencement of the action and the
date fixed when the statute commences to run are clearly and plainly unreasonable." Id. at 314.
50. See Emberson v. Buffington, 228 Ark. 120, 306 S.W.2d 326 (1957) (portion of statute that provided that persons related to the driver of an automobile
have no cause of action against the driver for personal injuries resulting from the
driver's negligence held to violate Arkansas Constitution); Wright v. Central
DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) (provision of statute
limiting recovery in medical malpractice actions to $500,000 held to be violative
of Illinois
Constitution
as arbitrary
andScholarship
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51. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960).
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